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Abstract 
This article explores the limits and opportunities for enhancing the democratic legitimacy of EU 
actions in the field of professional sport using new modes of governance. It presents a conceptual 
toolkit by which the ‘throughput legitimacy’ of an EU policy can be analysed. Analysing the 
throughput legitimacy of the European social dialogue, we establish that, by improving the latter, 
both input and output legitimacy can be increased. The EU could borrow some of the positive 
elements of the social dialogue approach and incorporate them in the steering of other issues in 
professional sport. For instance, it may be interesting to pre-establish certain conditions on 
representativeness and relevance for participation in the policy process. Crucially, working on a clear 
theme-per-theme-basis instead of organising outsized gatherings such as the EU sport forum would 
definitely benefit throughput legitimacy. 
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Since the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, the article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) grants the EU a formal role in the field of sport. As such, ‘sporting bodies can 
no longer claim that sport is none of the EU’s business’ (Weatherill 2011: 12). Since the member 
states only granted the EU a supporting competence, i.e. the weakest type of the three principal 
types of EU competence, the EU can only coordinate or supplement the actions of the member 
states. From a legal point of view, the importance of the new legal provision is thus essentially 
symbolical, as it merely legitimises EU action already taken in the field of sport and, in addition, will 
not change the approach of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in sport cases as established in the 
1974 Walrave (CJEU, Case 36/74 Walrave [1974] E.C.R. 1405) and the 2006 Meca-Medina CJEU, Case 
C-519/04 (Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission [2006] E.C.R. II-3291cases) (Van den Bogaert 
and Vermeersch 2006; Weatherill 2006; Vermeersch 2009; Weatherill 2011). From a practical 
viewpoint, the concrete policy instruments the EU has at its disposal for interventions in sport also 
remain unchanged. Given the weak EU sporting competence, these can be classified under the 
heading of so-called soft-instruments.  
That being said, there are a number of reasons why it can be expected that the EU will increasingly 
play a more prominent role in the governance of professional sport. Currently, it is generally 
assumed that the EU offers sports bodies a degree of “supervised autonomy”, which implies that EU 
institutions do not have a proactive role in directly regulating sports governance, but that they ‘play 
a supervisory role to ensure sport organisations behave within the limits of EU law’ (Foster 2000: 58; 
García 2007: 218; García 2009: 280). Indeed, it is fair to say that the EU has been rather reactive in 
its approach towards professional sports (Croci 2009: 150). However, three indications suggest a 
certain shift towards a more proactive attitude. First of all, article 165 TFEU unquestionably created 
‘institutional momentum’ (Weatherill 2011: 12) since it obliged EU institutions to their approaches 
to sport. For instance, the Council, which no longer works on a mere informal basis on sport, has 
been issuing increasingly significant resolutions on sport (Council of the European Union 2010, 
2011a, 2011b), and there have been preparatory initiatives and studies on match-fixing, doping, the 
transfer system in football, players’ agents and good governance in sport governing bodies. 
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Secondly, while EU actions in sport could and still can be linked to other areas of competence, the 
new budget for sport, intended for sport-specific projects, opens a range of opportunities to the 
funding of sport-specific initiatives, facilitating a ‘coherent pattern of development’ (Vermeersch 
2009: 6). Finally, the Lisbon Treaty seems to have made the Commission’s tone less cautious towards 
sport governing bodies: if they are not respectful of principals of good governance, they can expect 
their autonomy to be to be curtailed (European Commission 2011: 10; Interview European 
Commission Administrator July 2013). Altogether, it is clear that the Lisbon treaty brought in its 
wake a dynamism which opened a window of opportunities for the development of the role of the 
EU in professional sport (Interview European Commission Administrator, July 2013). 
The shift towards a more proactive approach suggests that the Commission will do more than 
merely play a supervisory role to ensure sport organizations behave within the limits of EU law. The 
approach of the EU towards professional sports through soft-instruments will increasingly be in line 
with the so-called ‘new modes of governance’, which have gained in salience in EU governance since 
the 1990s (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Scott and Trubek 2002; Radaelli 2003; Tömmel and Verdun 
2009; Héritier and Rhodes 2011). New modes of governance are characterised by their use of soft 
policy instruments such as incentivisation, bargaining, persuasion and information/monitoring 
instead of the traditional command and control. As such, they offer both limits and opportunities 
with regard to the democratic legitimacy of the EU. It is the aim of this contribution to analyse these 
in the light of EU initiatives in professional sport. Given the importance the EU attaches to promoting 
democracy, transparency, accountability and inclusiveness in sport (European Commission 2011: 
10), it seems logical that its own approach to sport adheres to those very standards. 
This article proceeds as follows. First, it briefly discusses the rise and nature of new modes of 
governance in the EU and the concrete policy instruments that emerge from this new approach. 
Consequently, the conceptual shortcomings of “supervised autonomy” with regard to characterising 
the approach of the EU towards sport are highlighted. Next, the limits and opportunities of the new 
modes of governance with regard to the input and output legitimacy of the EU are discussed. 
Subsequently, throughput legitimacy is introduced as a concept by which the input and output 
legitimacy of new modes of governance can be improved and a toolkit is presented by which the 
concept can be analysed, on the basis of a number of basic criteria that emerge from the literature 
on democratic governance. Finally, the article analyses the throughput legitimacy of the European 
social dialogue in professional football and its consequences for input and output legitimacy. 
Bringing together UEFA and the European representative organizations for football leagues, clubs 
and players, the European Union Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee in the Professional Football 
sector was established in 2008 and in April 2012, an agreement on minimum requirements for 
standard football players’ contracts was reached. The European social dialogue in professional 
football presents the EU’s first experience with an established new mode of governance (Smismans 
2008) in the field of professional sport and thus constitutes an excellent case for analysis. In the end, 
lessons with regard to input and output legitimacy are drawn for future EU initiatives in professional 
sport and it is briefly discussed how throughput legitimacy can also be useful for the search for more 
democratic legitimacy in the sports world in general. 
 
MOVING BEYOND SUPERVISED AUTONOMY TO THEORIZE THE ROLE OF THE EU IN SPORT 
GOVERNANCE: NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE 
Elaborating on Foster (2000), García (2009, 2013) argues that the EU current approach towards 
sports federations corresponds with “supervised autonomy”, which implies that EU institutions do 
not have a proactive role in directly regulating sports governance, but that they play a supervisory 
role to ensure that sport organizations behave within the limits of EU law. The problem with 
“supervised autonomy’” conceptualised by Foster (2000: 58) as the regulation of sport by the 
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Commission through competition policy which allows for exemptions to be granted in particular 
cases, is that it has a strong regulatory bias and, as such, does not take into account the role of the 
EU in sport beyond its ‘regulatory mode’ (Wallace 2005: 81). The part the Commission can play in 
professional sport is limited to its role as public enforcer of EU competition law. In this capacity, the 
Commission has the competence to investigate whether practices of undertakings comply with the 
provisions on competition policy. The definition of the concept does not fully cover reality, since the 
EU has a much broader role to play in professional sport. The EU can use – and has used - softer 
governance approaches in line with the new modes of EU governance in order to “steer” 
professional sport instead of regulating it, for which it lacks formal authority. Since the reality of the 
Lisbon Treaty suggests that the way forward for the EU in professional sport is new modes of 
governance, a new dimension needs to be added to the three-fold typology to theorize the role of 
the EU in sport governance presented by Foster (2000) and García (2009). This section takes a closer 
look at the new modes of governance in the EU in order to set the scene. 
The emergence of new modes of governance in the EU dates back to the 1970s. It could initially be 
regarded as a transitional arrangement between policy making rooted at the national level and a 
formal competence for action by the EU. There were certain areas where the EU did (and does) not 
hold a strong mandate, for instance where member states fundamentally disagree about policy 
approaches or want to retain authority, but where some form of collective action was nevertheless 
deemed necessary (Wallace 2005: 85; Büchs 2007). New modes of governance have been on the rise 
in EU governance since new, softer methods of governance gained in salience in the 1990s in a 
response to questions about the effectiveness of uniform EU legislation and the legitimacy for 
further delegation of regulatory powers to the EU (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Scott and Trubek 
2002; Radaelli 2003; Büchs 2007: 22-27; Tömmel and Verdun 2009; Héritier and Rhodes 2011). Much 
in line with the increasing literature on governance, traditional forms of command and control 
through legislation were viewed as exclusive, static, incapable of addressing societal complexity, 
unable to adapt well to changing circumstances, and limited in their production of the knowledge 
needed to solve problems. It is presumed that, by moving away from command and control towards 
a system of “governance”, the EU is able to promote flexibility and learning through the use of soft 
law. The Commission acknowledged these processes and presented its 2001 White Paper on 
Governance in which it stressed that ‘proposals must be prepared on the basis of an effective 
analysis of whether it is appropriate to intervene at EU level and whether regulatory intervention is 
needed. If so, the analysis must also assess the potential economic, social and environmental 
impact, as well as the costs and benefits of that particular approach’ (European Commission 2001: 
20). In case regulatory interventions are not deemed necessary, recourse should be found with new 
modes of governance, which do not produce legislation, but EU decisions of a different kind: 
recommendations, advice on best practices, information and guidelines (European Commission 
2009). 
While academic literature offers little differentiation between new modes of governance - they are 
often grouped together by scholars - there exists no generally accepted single method of 
classification (e.g. Best 2008; Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2011: 51-53). In addition, the EU has not had 
much (positive) experience in the steering of private actors and therefore such governance modes 
need to further crystallise (Best 2008: 14-16: Verbruggen 2009: 430). It seems therefore advisable to 
present a classification of the concrete policy instruments that emerge from new modes of 
governance in order to interpret the concept. In this regard, Héritier and Lehmkuhl (2011: 57-58) 
distinguish between incentivisation, bargaining, persuasion, information/monitoring and model 
function (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: Policy instruments that emerge from the new modes of governance in the EU 
Instruments used to attain a stated policy goal Definition 
Incentivisation Positive and negative inducements to produce a desired 
behaviour 
Bargaining Exchange of resources and positions between actors to 
reach a defined policy goal 
Persuasion Actors’ behaviour is influenced by arguments and reasoning 
Information/monitoring Desired behaviour is prompted by the spread of 
information and possible monitoring of the desired 
performance and the publication of results (‘naming’ and 
‘shaming’) 
Model function Relies on the positive influence that a successful behaviour, 
the model, may have on other actors 
Source: adapted from Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2011: 57-58 
 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
This section discusses the limits and opportunities of new modes of governance for contributing to 
the democratic legitimacy of the EU. It starts from the classic distinction by Scharpf (1970, 1999), 
who divided democratic legitimation into output and input. In short, the output legitimacy of the EU 
can be assessed in terms of the effectiveness of the EU’s policy outcomes for the people. Policies are 
input legitimate when they are in line with the popular will expressed by the political majority of the 
elected assemblies and thus, the focus here is on policy by the people. Importantly, recent work on 
the democratic legitimacy of the EU has added another dimension to this debate: interest 
intermediation with the people, which Vivien Schmidt (2013) has recently labelled ‘throughput 
legitimacy’. Schmidt demonstrates how enhancing throughput legitimacy may lead to improved 
input and output legitimacy, but she did not operationalize the concept. Hence, the subsequent 




Policies are input legitimate when they are in line with the popular will expressed by the political 
majority of the elected assemblies. That so-called “participatory rhetoric” is however problematic in 
EU policy-making, as the distance between the directly affected citizens and their representatives is 
quite large(Sharpf 1999: 9); the European Parliament elections fail to attract citizen interest and they 
have low turnout rates, and EU citizens cannot express their approval or disapproval of EU policies 
since there is no EU government to vote in or out (Scharpf 1999; Mair 2006; Hix 2008; Schmidt 2013: 
12), although the Lisbon Treaty introduces the requirement by the European Council to take account 
of the results of the European Parliament elections when nominating the candidate as President of 
the Commission. In addition, from a more constructivist point of view, the majority rule will only be 
accepted in polities with a “thick” collective identity - that is, in polities based on pre-existing 
commonalities of history, language, culture, and ethnicity (Sharpf 1999: 9-10). As the notion of EU 
citizenship, as introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, currently primarily is a legal concept rather 
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than a political reality, this is currently not (yet) the case. Consequently, almost no scholars think the 
EU has sufficient input legitimacy (but see Lenaerts 2013). 
However, the rise of new modes of governance is said to contribute to the input legitimacy of the EU 
(Zeitlin and Pochet 2005; Kohler-Koch 2007; Sabel and Seitlin 2010). For instance, in their seminal 
article, Joanne Scott and David Trubek (2001) contend that in new modes of governance, a broad 
range of actors are expected to be involved, thus developing a new form of input legitimacy. This 
view is increasingly being adjusted or even refuted by those who claim that new modes of 
governance have a negative impact on input legitimacy since the European Parliament remains 
seriously marginalised or totally outside of the consultation processes of the new governance 
modes, and the latter have a negative impact on input legitimacy of EU policy processes (Raunio 
2006; Borrás and Conzelmann 2007: 541; Büchs 2007: 150). Such arguments are in line with the 
constructivist stance that citizens’ interests are not pre-existing and public and parliamentary 
discussions are crucial for establishing these (Büchs 2007: 150). In addition, the danger exists that 
policy processes in new modes of governance suffer from a lack of accountability with regard to the 
European Parliament (Lord 2004; Bovens, Curtin and ‘t Hart 2010; Menon and Peet 2010). Finally, 
strong and resourceful elites may be privileged, and, in this regard, direct participation of private 
actors may even constitute an impediment for increasing input legitimacy of policy processes 
(Sørensen and Torfing 2005; Borrás and Conzelmann 2007; Büchs 2007: 148; Greenwood 2007; 
Skelcher 2007; Sørensen and Torfing 2009: 234; Schmidt 2013: 16). 
 
Output legitimacy 
Since the EU cannot be regarded as democratic in the input sense, according to Sharpf (1999), a 
more modest form of legitimisation must uphold the Union. Sharpf therefore introduces the concept 
of ‘output-oriented legitimacy’, where political choices are legitimate if and because they effectively 
promote the common welfare of the constituency in question: ‘government for the people’ (Scharpf 
1999: 6-10). According to Scharpf (1999: 11-12), output-oriented legitimacy requires no more than 
the perception of a range of common interests that is sufficiently broad and stable to justify 
institutional arrangements for collective action. Thus, he restricts his argument to “consensual” 
policy areas (Sharpf 1999: 22).1 New modes of governance in the EU are said to contribute to the 
output legitimacy of the EU since horizontal, networked forms of governance are deemed more 
effective than traditional forms of command and control (Klijn and Koppenjan 2004). However, this 
view has been criticised later on, as empirical results for the new modes of governance remained 
rather limited (Hodson 2004; Zeitlin and Pochet 2005; Idema and Kelemen 2006; Büchs 2007; 
Haztopoulos 2007; de la Porte and Pochet 2012). 
 
INCREASING INPUT AND OUTPUT LEGITIMACY VIA THROUGHPUT LEGITIMACY 
Although often discussed in literature in input or output terms, Schmidt (2013) demonstrates how 
throughput mechanisms can be brought under a more general rubric for the purpose of analytic 
reasons, constituting a third and distinct criterion in the normative analysis of democratic legitimacy. 
Throughput encompasses the numerous ways in which the policy processes work in order to ensure 
‘the accountability of those engaged in making the decisions, the transparency of the information 
and the inclusiveness and openness to civil society’ (Schmidt 2013: 7). Throughput legitimacy moves 
beyond the traditional input-output dichotomy by focusing on the quality of interactions among 
actors engaged in EU decision-making process (Schmidt 2013: 7-8).  
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By enhancing the throughput legitimacy of new modes of governance, issues with regard to their 
input and output legitimacy can be remedied (Sørensen and Torfing 2005; Sørensen and Torfing 
2009). Throughput legitimacy can lead to increased output legitimacy since particular governance 
processes are seen as preconditions for better output performance, and to improved input 
legitimacy since certain institutional processes or deliberative interactions are preconditions for 
better input participation (Schmidt 2013: 14). 
 
Introducing a toolkit for analysing throughput legitimacy 
This section presents a toolkit for analysing the four dimensions of throughput legitimacy, emerging 
from the literature on democratic governance, based on Schmidt’s analysis (2013), and efficacy, 
accountability, transparency and inclusiveness and openness to civil society. 
 
Efficacy 
According to Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing (2009), new modes of governance can contribute to 
effective governance only provided that the network of actors involved in the governance, i.e. the 
governance network, is carefully meta-governed by politicians, public manager and other relevant 
actors. Meta-governance holds that the most appropriate way of controlling governance networks is 
by “steering”, which entails that, via a series of more or less subtle and indirect forms of governance, 
meta-governors should seek to shape the free actions of the network actors in accordance with a 
number of pre-defined general procedural standards and substantial goals. Thus, ‘the conditions for 
interaction of relatively free and self-responsible actors within governance networks are structured 
in order to ensure conformity with some generally defined objectives’ (Sørensen and Torfing 2005: 
202). 
In order to meta-govern effectively, meta-governors must combine ‘hands-off’ and ‘hands-on’ forms 
of meta-governance (Sørensen and Torfing 2009: 247). Hands-off forms of meta-governance - 
meaning at a distance from the self-regulating governance networks - are adequate in the initial 
phase of the steering of the governance network. The term comprises network design and network 
framing as meta-governance methods. Network design involves the shaping and structuring of 
governance networks, either by encouraging the formation of particular forms of networks, or by 
relying on pre-established networks. During this process, meta-governors influence inclusion and 
exclusion of certain actors and the empowerment of weaker actors and determine the scope of the 
network (Sørensen and Torfing 2005: 204). Network framing involves the formulation of the political 
goals and objectives, which can be broadly defined, to be pursued by the network and the allocation 
of resources. Sometimes, a legal framework that facilitates and constraints the network, may even 
be drawn. Network framing must always be backed by the continuous monitoring and critical 
evaluation of the output of the network (Sørensen and Torfing 2005: 204). 
Hands-on forms of meta-governance are recommended when the governance network shows signs 
of failure and close interaction between the meta-governors, and the governance network is 
needed. This is for instance the case when conflicts arise between network actors, when deadlocks 
occur, when key actors are excluded from the policy deliberations, or, when policy output stays too 
far from what is deemed acceptable by the meta-governors (Sørensen and Torfing 2009: 247). The 
first hands-on form of meta-governance is network management, which includes attempts by meta-
governors to reduce tensions through conflict management, promoting favourable conditions and 
providing inputs and resources for joint action, and empowering certain actors (Kickert and 
Koppenjan 1997: 47-51; Sørensen and Torfing 2009: 247). The second hands-on form of meta-
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governance is network participation, which requires the participation of the democratically elected 
politicians in the networks. This way, it is possible to get first-hand knowledge of the policy 
processes and exert political authority in order to influence the network (Sørensen and Torfing 2005: 
204-205, 2009: 247). Hands-on forms of meta-governance are not only appropriate in the case of 
governance network failures, as it is also quite common in policy areas closely related to the core 
functions of the state (Sørensen and Torfing 2009: 247). However, if the relative autonomy of the 
network is a key political goal, as is the case with sport at the EU level, hands-on forms of meta-
governance may be avoided by elected politicians and public administrators. The efficacy of the 
policy processes of course also depends on democratic quality. For instance, deliberations between 
actors need to be governed by a ‘democratic ethos’, ensuring openness, relative transparency, 
respect and a commitment to reach a rough consensus (Sørensen and Torfing 2005: 211-214; 
Torfing, Sørensen and Fotel: 2009: 291-294). 
 
Accountability and transparency 
As mentioned earlier, the danger exists that policy processes in new modes of governance suffer 
from a lack of accountability with regard to the European Parliament (Lord 2004; Bovens, Curtin and 
‘t Hart 2010; Menon and Peet 2010). It is therefore important that the Parliament has the possibility 
to scrutinise the policy processes of these modes. In addition, whereas accountability within an EU 
context in general implies that EU actors are responsive to participatory input demands and can be 
held responsible for their output decisions, it is essential that the network of actors engaged in the 
policy processes of the new methods of governance are responsive to public contestation, meaning 
that they should respond positively to constructive proposals raised in public debate (Harlow and 
Rawlings 2007; Torfing, Sørensen and Fotel 2009: 291). 
The members of the civil society organizations that are involved in the policy processes of the new 
modes of governance constitute ‘a demos of directly affected people’ (Sørensen and Torfing 2003: 
617). In order to have a positive effect on input legitimacy, those whose interests are being 
represented therefore must have access to information about the policy processes and the capacity 
and opportunity to critically evaluate the pursuit and construction of their interests and preferences. 
Furthermore, the representatives must of course be responsive to criticism from the represented 
and they must represent who they claim to represent (Sørensen and Torfing 2005: 206; Torfing, 
Sørensen and Fotel 2009: 288-289). 
Conceptually, transparency is closely related and even connected to accountability. In the narrow 
sense of the term, accountability ‘requires institutions to inform their members of decisions and of 
the grounds on which decisions are taken’ (Woods 1999: 44). In a similar vein, public accountability 
is crucial to prevent new modes of governance from ‘operating in the dark’ (Fox and Miller 1995; 
Dryzek 2000; Newman 2005). It is therefore paramount that narrative accounts are produced that 
seek ‘to justify decisions, actions and results in the eyes of the broader citizenry’ (Torfing, Sørensen 
and Fotel 2009: 291). 
 
Inclusiveness and openness to civil society  
Although democratic procedures are subject to endless contestations, there are certain general rules 
and norms that are generally accepted as inherent to a democratic grammar of conduct, such as the 
participation in policy processes by those who are affected by the policy (Arnstein 1969; Pateman 
1970). Interest group participation in policy making or ‘functional representation’ through interest 
groups therefore has been identified as a form of democracy in its own right as well as a corrective 
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to representative democracy (Cohen and Rogers 1992, Kohler-Koch 2007; Kröger 2008). However, 
none of the affected stakeholders must be marginalised in a way that systematically prevents them 
from influencing policy (Young 2000). It is mentioned above that the danger exists in new 
governance modes that strong and resourceful elites are privileged, diminishing the input-legitimacy 
of policy processes. Therefore, the degree of inclusion in new modes of governance should be ‘a 
function of the intensity of the actors’ affectedness, and the included actors should be able to 
influence the decisions’ (Torfing, Sørensen and Fotel 2009: 294). Since the relevance of the 
respective actors included in the policy processes may decline and the presence of other actors may 
indeed become more pertinent, the inclusion and exclusion of actors must be subject to on-going 
consideration and negotiation.  
 
THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL DIALOGUE IN PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL 
This final section analyses the European social dialogue in professional football. In particular, 
conclusions are drawn on the positive and negative effects of the relevant policy processes on input 
and output legitimacy. Using the toolkit presented in the previous section for assessing the elements 
of throughput legitimacy suggested by Schmidt (2013), key points for attention with regard to the 
democratic legitimacy of a more proactive EU approach in professional sport are uncovered. 
Although the European social dialogue in professional football constitutes a special case as the EU 
can rely on pre-established practices and even a legal framework (Colucci and Geeraert 2012), this 
does not mean that the conclusions of this paper cannot be translated to sport-specific EU actions.  
The data for the analysis was gathered firstly through documentary analysis, which included official 
press releases from various actors, the memoranda of understanding concluded between UEFA and 
the involved stakeholders, official EU policy documents and relevant academic literature. Secondly, 
since many internal processes remain informal and are thus not accessible in written form, seven 
semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted and used as the primary source of 
information about internal processes, assessments and viewpoints. The focus was on the (assumed) 
diverse viewpoints of the actors (see Bogason and Zølner 2007: 13); the interviews were conducted 
in person (5) and over the phone (2) in August and September 2012 and in July 2013 with 
representatives from Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) (2), European Club Assiciation 
(ECA), Fédération Internationale des Associations de Footballeurs Professionnels (FIFPro), the 
European Commission (2) and the European Parliament. European Professional Football Leagues 
(EPFL) declined to cooperate. 
 
Background 
On the conclusion of the agreement on new FIFA rules on international transfers of football players 
between the main football associations FIFA and UEFA on the one side, and the EU Commissioners in 
charge of competition, sport and social affairs on the other side, the Commission invited FIFA and 
UEFA to encourage clubs to start or pursue social dialogue with the representative bodies of football 
players and for this purpose, and offered the Commission’s assistance. In July 2008, following the 
signing of the Rules of Procedure by the participating parties, the European Union Sectoral Social 
Dialogue Committee in the Professional Football sector (SDCPF) was established. The committee 
brings together UEFA and the European representative organizations for football leagues (EPFL), 
clubs (ECA) and players (FIFPro). In April 2012, the relevant internal bodies of the involved 
organizations ratified an agreement on minimum requirements for standard football players’ 
contracts. 
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Efficacy 
The European Commission was quite successful as meta-governor (see Table 2). First of all, since it 
had been encouraging the formation of a social dialogue committee in professional football since 
2001, it has been very involved in the network design of the SDCPF. The Commission also provided 
important resources to the SDCPF actors and supported projects and studies. This resonates with the 
Commission’s role under article 154 (1) TFEU, which limits its task to taking ‘any relevant measure to 
facilitate social dialogue by ensuring balancing support for the parties’.In terms of network framing, 
the Commission provided important resources to the SDCPF actors. According to all interviewees, 
indirect financial support through, for instance, the reimbursement of travel expenses by the 
Commission is particularly important to FIFPro, whose budget is far more limited than those of the 
other participating organizations. The Commission made sure that actors are brought together in a 
room, where they are obliged to dialogue. The legal framework of the EU social dialogue is helpful 
and ‘provides an interesting platform for the conclusion of agreements’ (Interview: Stakeholder 
official, August 2012). However, there are also serious limitations (Colucci and Geeraert 2012). The 
objectives of the Committee are clear: to deliver opinions on labour matters to the Commission; to 
reach agreements in accordance with the Treaty provisions on social dialogue; and, to encourage 
and develop social dialogue at sectoral level (European Commission 2008: Article 1). 
 






Definition European social dialogue in 
football 
Hands-off 
Network design The shaping and structuring of 
governance networks, either by 
encouraging the formation of 
particular forms of networks, or by 
relying on pre-established 
networks 
 Encouraged the formation of the 
committee since 2001  
 Support to a number of projects  
Network framing The formulation of the political 
goals and objectives, which can be 
broadly defined, to be pursued by 
the network and the allocation of 
resources 
 Broad formulation of objectives 
 Support to a number of projects  




Attempts by meta-governors to 
reduce tensions through conflict 
management, promoting 
favourable conditions and 
providing inputs and resources for 
joint action, and empowering 
certain actors 
 Drafting of compromise agreement 
 Bi-lateral talks with actors during 
impasse 
 Empowering of FIFPro 
Network 
participation 
The participation of democratically 
elected politicians in the networks 
in order to get first-hand 
knowledge of the policy processes 
and to exert their political 
authority in order to influence the 
network 
Avoided due to the autonomy of sport, 
the political sensitiveness of the issue 
and a lack of interest 
Source: adapted from Kickert and Koppenjan 1997: 47-51; Sørensen and Torfing 2005: 204; Sørensen and Torfing 2009: 
247; own analysis 
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The Commission also succeeded in managing the network. When the SDCPF reached an impasse in 
early 2011, the Commission tried to reconcile differences, for instance by organising bilateral 
negotiations with the individual parties (Interview: Stakeholder official, September 2012) and 
eventually drafted a compromise agreement ‘which would eventually serve as the basis for the final 
agreement’ (Interview: Stakeholder official, August 2012). The Commission has also exercised some 
form of indirect pressure to come to a solution. In case the impasse had not been resolved, the 
Commission would have refused to renew the committee’s budget, which would have resulted in 
the death of the committee (Interview: Stakeholder official, September 2012). This would entail high 
political costs for the participating parties, since ‘it is very important to have good relations with the 
EU’ (Interview: Stakeholder official, August 2012). There is no network participation by 
democratically elected politicians in the social dialogue in professional football. This is of course due 
to the political sensitiveness of interventions in professional sport, but the sui generis nature of the 
EU, i.e. the lack of a traditional government, also plays an important part. Instead, meta-governance 
was conducted by public administrators, which is in fact customary (Kingdon 1984; Kickert, Klijn and 
Koppenjan 1997; Skelcher, Mathur and Smith 2005). 
The deliberations between actors were generally governed by a ‘democratic ethos’. The 
interviewees all agree that negotiations happened in a relatively good atmosphere. One described 
the relation between the actors as ‘cordial’ (Interview: Stakeholder official, August 2012). Another 
contended that, while there were some disagreements from time to time, after the negotiations, the 
negotiators were ‘happy to enjoy a beer together’ (Interview: Stakeholder official, August 2012). 
One stakeholder official was slightly less positive and held that ‘of course there was some hostility 
from time to time, but I would rather call it passion’ (Interview: Stakeholder official, September 
2012). Furthermore, the negotiations reportedly were relatively transparent, although ECA and EPFL 
often tuned their proposals and measured them with UEFA before introducing them to FIFPro 
(Interview: Stakeholder official, August 2012). One interviewee argued that the latter was ‘necessary 
in order to reach a solution’ (Interview: Stakeholder official, August 2012). Finally, despite some 
worrying reports on FIFPro’s website (FIFPro 2011), the stakeholder interviews reveal that there 
certainly was a commitment to reach a consensus agreement. 
 
Accountability and transparency 
A general issue in new modes of EU governance, the European Parliament only plays an extremely 
marginal role in the European social dialogue in football. It has expressed its support for social 
dialogue in sport in general and football in particular in its 2008 Resolution on the White Paper on 
Sport (European Parliament 2008, points 105-106). In its 2012 Resolution on the European 
dimension in sport, the Parliament reiterates its support for social dialogue in sport in general 
(European Parliament 2012, recital AB; point 49). One interviewee stated that the Parliament does 
not offer much solid support to the SDCPF (Interview: Stakeholder official, September 2012). Two 
other interviewees frame this in the general lack of interest of EU-level politicians in the social 
dialogue in football (Interview: Stakeholder official, August 2012, September 2012). 
The stakeholder interviews reveal that, in general, ECA and FIFPro had a sufficiently broad mandate 
to conclude an agreement on behalf of the represented organizations, despite there being some 
issues in the past with regard to the latter organization (see Irving 2002: 713; Dabscheck 2003: 97-
102). The ECA official did admit that ECA administrators sometimes had to make some efforts to 
have certain elements sold to the ECA member base. All interviewees pointed to the fact that there 
were some serious doubts as regards EPFL’s mandate. At a certain point, its CEO was not even sure 
about the scope of EPFL’s mandate (Interview:Stakeholder official, August 2012). Reportedly, 
especially the Spanish and Italian leagues are very reluctant to give away their bargaining powers to 
EPFL (Colucci and Geeraert 2012: 221-222; Interview: Stakeholder official, August 2012). Such 
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reluctance is in fact a familiar issue in EU level social dialogue (see De Boer, Benedictus and van der 
Meer 2005; European Commission 2010: 17) and the ratification process following the signing of the 
agreement on MRSPC in the SDCPF underlined these issues. Certain stronger leagues did not want to 
ratify any agreement and eventually, those countries where the standard of contractual protection is 
above the standards provided in the SDCPF agreement on MRSPC - 16 in total- were excluded from 
the agreement by means of a side-letter agreement (ECA, EPFL, FIFPro and UEFA 2012). Since the 
agreement on MRSPC had to be ratified by the relevant internal bodies of the signatory parties, the 
represented organizations definitely had the opportunity to critically evaluate how their interests 
and preferences were pursued by the representative organizations. 
Narrative accounts published by the network are very scarce. Apart from FIFPro, which regularly 
produced (rather cynical) news articles on the SDCPF on its website, the actors and the Commission 
limited themselves to the reporting of key-events such as the installation of the Committee and the 
signing and ratification of the agreement. The Commission in particular could do a better job in 
providing objective information on the actions and decision in the Committee. For instance, the side-
letter agreement which excludes 16 countries from the scope of the MRSPC agreement is nowhere 
mentioned or explained. On the contrary, the Commission mistakenly reports that ‘the Agreement 
covers not only the 27 EU Member States but all 53 national federations which are members of 
UEFA’ (European Commission 2012). 
 
Inclusiveness and openness to civil society  
Decisions with regard to labour issues in football above all affect players and clubs. In the SDCPF, 
European football players are represented by FIFPro Europe, and clubs are represented by ECA and –
indirectly- EPFL. One could argue that ECA is more relevant than EPFL, but the top European leagues 
represented by EPFL are equally affected since they have an important role to play in the 
implementation of the agreement because the agreement will have to be implemented in the 
national bargaining agreements in order for it to have any direct legal effect (Colucci and Geeraert 
2012). The stakeholder interviews revealed that all the included actors were able to influence 
decisions in the network. This is also evident from an analysis of the negotiations in the Committee 
(Colucci and Geeraert 2012: 223-229). All interviewees share the same unambiguously clear view 
that, perhaps apart from the occasional reporting on the instalment of the committee, there was 
and still is no interest from the press in the SDCPF. Consequently, there was no opportunity for the 
actors to display any responsiveness towards external criticism. 
When social partners make a joint request to take part in social dialogue at European level, 
organizations representing both sides of industry must fulfil certain criteria, which are assessed by 
the Commission (European Commission 1998: Article 1). In the White Paper on Sport, the European 
Commission acknowledged that ‘relevant third bodies’ could be invited to take part in the social 
dialogue ‘as observers’ (European Commission 2007, para. 5.3). Moreover, as the Commission 
acknowledged the difficulty to predetermine the form of a social dialogue in the sports sector and, 
therefore, it declared to be ready to ‘examine any request to set up a sectoral social dialogue 
committee in a pragmatic manner’ (European Commission 2007: para. 5.3). The most suitable 
representative organizations for workers and employers in European football are currently involved 
in the SDCPF, although the Commission applied its predetermined criteria rather loosely, which 
indicates that mutual recognition by the involved parties is more important than actually meeting 
those criteria. At this point, the only excluded organization that could possibly be interested in 
participating in the SDCPF is FIFA. FIFA very much is a ‘relevant third body’ with regard to labour 
issues in football and therefore would certainly be accepted by the Commission ‘as an observer’ in 
the Committee.  
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The danger that strong and resourceful elites are privileged is extremely pertinent in European 
football governance. UEFA formally has as an objective that it ensures the needs of the different 
stakeholders in European football are properly taken into account. However, clubs have 
considerably more control over UEFA than players. At the end of the 1990s, UEFA realised that clubs, 
as opposed to players, have – and considered - the “exit” option (Hirschmann 1970), when a group 
of elite European clubs threatened to establish a European Super League outside of its structures. In 
addition, UEFA’s statutes stipulate that every Executive Committee member, except the UEFA 
president, has to hold office in a national federation (UEFA 2012: Article 21.3) and the latter are 
highly receptive to clubs’ concerns (Interview UEFA official, 11 July 2013). Moreover, while the more 
regular contact between FIFPro officials and UEFA is a relatively recent phenomenon, UEFA has a 
tradition of dealing with clubs and never directly with players. Clubs consequently have managed to 
obtain important concessions from UEFA. For instance, they take a majority of the seats in UEFA’s 
Club Competitions Committee, which among others draws up recommendations and exchanges 
views regarding possible modifications to the existing UEFA club competitions and to the regulations 
governing these competitions (UEFA 2012: Article 22). Furthermore, the recently renewed 
memorandum of understanding between ECA and UEFA includes arrangements on an increase of 
the agreed amount to be distributed to clubs for giving their players away to national teams; an 
insurance covering the risk of injury while on international team duty; and the international match 
calendar (UEFA and ECA 2012). 
FIFPro’s participation in the social dialogue has unquestionably improved its representativeness and 
legitimacy, and has thus enhanced its position in the governance of European football. By providing 
expertise and indirect financial support through, for instance, the reimbursement of travel expenses, 
the Commission further contributed to the empowerment of FIFPro. Finally, by making sure that 
actors are brought together in a room, where they are obliged to dialogue, the Commission made 
sure that FIFPro was able to influence the decisions made by the governance network (Interview: 
Stakeholder official, September 2012). This is in line with other active EU policies that help to 
address potential asymmetries of power between different constituencies of groups, for instance 
through EU funding (Greenwood 2007: 344). 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article looked into the limits and opportunities for enhancing the democratic legitimacy of EU 
actions in the field of professional sport, given the legal context in which these necessarily take 
place. By analysing the throughput legitimacy of the European social dialogue in professional 
football, it was shown that by improving the latter, input and output legitimacy can be increased 
(see Table 3 for detailed conclusions of the analysis). In general, careful meta-governance by the 
European Commission contributed the most to output legitimacy since it facilitated and accelerated 
the conclusion of an agreement. In addition, the degree of inclusion in the policy processes was 
clearly a function of the intensity of the actors’ affectedness and the affected demos, constituted by 
the represented organizations, and could influence policy, increasing input legitimacy. Crucially, 
however, the European Parliament was not involved, few narrative accounts were made available, 
and incorrect information was published, impeding public contestation and thus decreasing input 
legitimacy. 
It is important to stress that many of the positive points with regard to throughput legitimacy result 
directly from the pre-existing structures, uses, experience, processes, the legal framework, and other 
peculiarities connected to the specific EU governance mode that is the European social dialogue. The 
EU can fall back on 15 years of experience and established practices in this field, while it lacks an 
established (and successful) approach in the steering of private actors in other fields. 
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 Deliberations between actors are 
governed by a democratic ethos 
Case:  
 European Commission did a very good job as meta-governor  
 Deliberations between actors were generally governed by a 
democratic ethos 
Input  
Output Meta-governance and democratic ethos in 
deliberations contribute to output legitimacy of 







 European Parliament scrutinises 
policy process 
 Responsiveness to public 
contestation 
 Represented demos has access to 
information about policy 
processes 
 Represented demos can critically 
evaluate pursuit and construction 
of their interests and preferences 
 Responsiveness from 
representatives to concerns 
raised by represented 
 Narrative accounts are produced 
that seek to justify policy in the 
eyes of the broader citizenry 
Case:  
 Marginal role and lack of interest European Parliament 
 No public contestation 
 In the case of EPFL, the represented organisations were not 
aware of the policy processes 
 Agreement had to be ratified by relevant internal organs of 
the parties, so member organisations could reject it; 
therefore there was high responsiveness from 
representative organisations towards represented 
organisations 
 Narrative accounts are scarce and often incorrect 
Input EU can increase input legitimacy by producing 
narrative accounts of higher quality more 
regularly, which may then lead to more public 
contestation. European Parliament needs to be 
involved in the policy process. FIFPro, ECA and 
EPFL are very responsive towards represented 
organisations. 
Output EPFL did not inform its members of the policy 
processes and this has repercussions for the 
effectiveness of the policy outcome since 
certain members refused to ratify and thus 




to Civil Society 
 Degree of inclusion is a function 
of the intensity of the actors 
affectedness 
 No actor is marginalised in a way 
that prevents it from influencing 
policy 
 Actors are able to influence 
decisions 
 Inclusion and exclusion are 
subject to on-going consideration 
and negotiation 
Case:  
 Directly affected organisations are represented 
 FIFPro risks being marginalised in football governance but, 
thanks to meta-governance by the European Commission, 
was empowered 
 All the actors were able to influence policy 
 Only potentially relevant actor currently not included is FIFA 
Input The affected demos could influence the policy 
process. 
Output The inclusion of relevant and representative 
organisations facilitates the multi-level 
implementation of policy. 
 
It may be worthwhile to borrow some of the positive elements of the social dialogue approach and 
incorporate them in the steering of other issues in professional sport, for instance match-fixing or 
doping. For example, it can be interesting to pre-establish both certain objectives that have to be 
attained and conditions on representativeness and relevance for participation in the policy process. 
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Crucially, working on a theme-per-theme-basis instead of organising outsized gatherings such as the 
EU sport forum would definitely benefit throughput legitimacy. 
Finally, our conclusions are also valuable for analysing the democratic legitimacy of the governance 
of professional sport when the EU does not take up a steering role. Since international sport 
organizations govern substantial areas of social life through their administrative decisions and public 
derogations, states have implicitly delegated certain tasks (related to the regulation of a public good, 
namely sport) to them (Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999; Hirst 2000: 20). In a similar vein, Héritier 
and Lehmkuhl (2008: 5) speak of ‘a tacit or explicit tolerance of governance actors’ policymaking on 
the part of governments’. Accordingly, it seems logical that these organizations adhere to high 
degrees of throughput legitimacy. In addition, while focusing exclusively on the input legitimacy of 
these organizations is not very useful, putting the focus purely on their effectiveness, or output 
legitimacy, also does not tell us anything about the democratic quality of their internal processes. By 
improving their throughput legitimacy, however, they can improve both their input and output 
legitimacy. 
Further research could focus on the underlying mechanisms that ensure effective steering of the 
sports world. It has been established that the effectiveness of new modes of governance depends 
largely on whether they operate ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’, that is, a credible threat of regulatory 
intervention (Sharpf 1994; Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008; Héritier and Rhodes 2011). In the case of 
sport, the shadow of hierarchy seems rather pale due to the EU’s limited competence. Sport bodies 
however seem to be willing to engage with the EU due to a latent fear of EU law, which may explain 
why an agreement was reached in the SDCPF, while extremely few agreements are reached in other 
European sectoral social dialogue committees exactly because of the lack of a shadow of hierarchy 
(Best 2008: 14; Smismans 2008; Geeraert 2013). Against this background, it could also be useful to 
focus on the effects of conflicting meta-governance messages (or a lack of support from the Council) 
on the effectiveness of EU steering. Finally, since the reality of the Lisbon Treaty suggests that the 
way forward for the EU in professional sport are new modes of governance, a new dimension should 
be added to the typology that was introduced by Foster (2000) and García (2009) to theorise the role 
of the EU in sport governance. Further research could explore the benefits of this new dimension by 
comparing them with the traditional trinity of self-regulation without the intervention of the EU law, 
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1
 On this note, with regard to EU involvement in professional sport, it is true that EU citizens tend to allocate the 
responsibility to the EU for those policy domains which are characterised by an endogenous internationalisation 
(Niedermayer and Sinnott 1995; De Winter and Swyngedouw 1999). Moreover, according to a Eurobarometer Survey from 
2004, a majority of EU citizens are in favour of a greater EU intervention in sport (European Commission 2004). 
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